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Abstract 
Purpose - To explore whether philosophical insights from Plato’s dialogue ‘Parmenides’ on the 
complex and often paradoxical  nature of change can illuminate the nature of information 
retrieval (IR).  IR is modeled as a dialectic process involving mutually dependent yet conflicting 
forces between the subjective and the objective. These forces operate to produce change in the 
subjective experience of users (becoming informed) through facilitating a relationship with 
objective documents. Accurately modeling, predicting and enabling this process remains a 
persistent problem for IR and this paper examines the extent to which this is because of the 
nature of change.  
Methodology/Approach - Conceptual analysis and literature review. 
Findings - The problem of change (what it is, how it happens and how we can know it has 
happened) is essential to our understanding of information as information normally implies some 
kind of change in knowledge state. Any process of change, however, on examination of its 
qualities, appears to necessitate the combination of irreconcilable and conflicting forces. The 
apparent contradictions within the existence of change as discussed in ‘Parmenides’ also exist in 
IR on both a theoretical and a technical level.   
Research Implications - Change is a central concept for information in general and IR in 
particular.  A deeper understanding of the paradoxical nature of change can provide new insights 
into IR theory and practice. 
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Originality/value of paper - Presents a new historical philosophical perspective on the nature of 
change and applies it to current IR problems. 
Keywords: Philosophy, Information Theory, Information Retrieval, Paradox, Dialectic, Change 
Paper Type: Conceptual paper 
Introduction  
This paper looks at one question: how important is an understanding of the concept of change to 
understanding the nature of IR?   It takes as its premise that information retrieval (IR) is a 
problematic and paradoxical field of enquiry which, despite considerable technical 
developments, has yet to create a coherent and agreed theoretical framework for its key 
questions. This lack of a clear theoretical structure within IR  and the persistent intractability of 
IR as a problem has also discussed by, amongst others, Blair (1990, 2006), Warner (2008) , 
Hjorland (1997, 2000, 2002, 2009) and Thornley and Gibb  (2009).  In this paper IR is modelled 
as a dialectical process arising from the dependent yet mutually conflicting relationship between 
the subjective (the user/s) and the objective (the document/s) (Thornley, 2005; Thornley and 
Gibb, 2007). The way in which these forces work together to initiate change is central to our 
understanding of information and IR. This is because information normally implies some kind of 
change in knowledge state and thus to understand IR we need to understand change. 
Understanding change (what it is, how it happens and how we can know it has happened) is, 
however, very difficult. Change is a problematic and paradoxical concept and its complex nature 
had been discussed in philosophy over thousands of years. I argue that we can use some of this 
discussion, in particular some of the arguments discussed in the Platonic dialogue ‘Parmenides’, 
to help us to understand what change is and thereby help us to understand IR.  
What exactly is problematic about change?  It is problematic because of the philosophical 
questions is raises concerning the nature of existence (a question of being), the relationship 
between generals and particulars (a question of language); and the possibility of measurement (a 
question of knowledge). Firstly, it requires something becoming something out of something 
which it is not (the juxtaposition of non-being and being). Secondly, if change exists how can 
abstract concepts describe our changeable physical world? Finally, as change is a fluid process, 
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how can we accurately measure when it has happened or to what extent? The process of change 
involves a relationship between opposing and yet related forces and thus can be understood as 
dialectical in nature. This argument is explored using a discussion of the apparent contradictions 
brought about by accepting the existence of change as discussed in ancient philosophy and then 
proceeds to show that these contradictions are also an ongoing problem for IR on both a 
theoretical and technical level. It concludes that this is because an understanding of information 
must incorporate an understanding of change and thus the complexities and contradictions within 
change will manifest themselves in IR. 
Structure of paper 
Firstly, I introduce and define the central concepts used in the argument and describe the scope 
of the paper.  This clarifies the nature of paradox i.e. the problem of conflicting ideas or concepts 
co-existing and I explain its relationship to change using the concept of the dialectic. I then 
discuss the ways in which I perceive IR to be a paradoxical problem i.e. is it actually the case 
that there is paradoxical problem in IR which is worthy of exploration? As part of this I outline 
my dialectical model of IR and discuss its relationship with change.  Secondly, I examine the 
discussion on the existence and nature of change primarily from the Socratic dialogue 
‘Parmenides’. I draw out the particular areas where the contradictory and problematic aspects of 
the change process are seen to arise and make some initial connections with related 
contradictions in IR. Whilst clearly more recent work on these questions has been covered in 
philosophy I maintain that the contribution of the ancient tradition is enormously influential on 
modern thinking and worthy of examination for both philosophical as well as historical reasons. 
This view is supported by influential voices in philosophy such as Anscombe (1981) who did 
detailed work on the influence of  Parmenides on Wittgenstein and also, perhaps the more well 
known thesis of Whitehead’s (1929) that the history of western philosophy is a series of 
footnotes to Plato. I then address in more detail how each of the contradictions or problem areas 
as discussed in the dialogue are also current and ongoing issues in IR and show that an increased 
understanding of the role of change in these contradictions can improve our understanding of 
their nature.  In conclusion, I review the contribution that an increased understanding of change 
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can make to the ongoing challenges of IR theory development, representing information and 
evaluating IR systems. 
 Paradox 
A paradox is a statement that contains conflicting ideas or concepts.  An example in philosophy 
is the Cretan liar paradox in which Epimenides (circa 600 BC) of Knossos in Crete claims all 
Cretan’s are liars. If he is correct then he contradicts himself as then he cannot be lying (he has in 
fact asserted a true claim).  This explanation, however, still leaves us with the question of what is 
a conflicting idea or concept, how can they both be contained in the same statement or indeed 
thing, and what happens when they are?  One way of understanding this is the concept of the 
dialectic which models this process as a struggle between oppositions which then results in some 
kind of change (which in turn is unstable and tends to lead to an increase in tension and then 
more change). I will provide a brief overview of the concept of  dialectic and then go onto 
discuss some examples in IR where these conflicts and paradoxes assert themselves. 
Dialectic  
The exact meaning of dialectic has developed over time. In earlier philosophy it was understood 
as a method of argumentation in which two opposing viewpoints would be discussed to 
eventually reach the truth.  In more recent philosophy, most notably the work of Marx (1867) 
and Hegel (1807), it is used as a way of analysing how conflicting forces create social change.  
Both these definitions, however, share the central theme of opposition and conflict causing 
change or the creation of something new.  The oppositions and resulting change and creation also 
tend to be unstable and forever changing as the opposing forces both require and repel each 
other.  Magee (2000, p.43) argues that the central role of change in reality is the most important 
aspect of Hegel’s contribution. 
“Hegel’s fundamental insight, out of which most other aspects of his thought evolved, was that 
reality is not a state of affairs but a process: it is something going on.” 
 
This view that reality is a process is very relevant to IR and also to information science (IS) in 
general in so far as information is both an object (for example a document) and a process (a user 
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becoming informed) in which the object ‘causes’ or has some impact on a change in knowledge 
state (Buckland, 1991a).  In Hegel’s philosophy the process of change is not random but the 
result of the interplay of forces that can be understood as a dialectic. 
 
“He (Hegel) formalised his view of change in what he called the dialectic: any positive state of 
affairs (let us call our assertion or description of it our thesis) will, merely by coming into 
existence, call into being contrary and incompatible states of affairs (the statement of this fact will 
be the anti-thesis) which de-stabilise and cause it to change into something new, a new situation, 
partly new and partly the same, in which what were destabilising elements in the old become 
constituent structural features (we call this synthesis). But this new state of affairs, merely by 
coming into existence, calls into being…etc., etc.” (Magee, 2000, p.43) 
 
Thus the concept of the dialectic in this paper is taken to mean a relationship between two 
opposing but mutually dependent objects or concepts. The opposition in the relationship creates 
conflict and energy which often causes change of some sort to happen. As the opposing objects 
or concepts also require each other it is never ending process, both elements need to survive, as if 
one destroyed the other it would also destroy itself. 
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I have, so far, introduced the nature of paradox and its connection through the concept of 
dialectic to the nature of change. My own previous work on the role of the dialectic in IR 
(Thornley, 2005; Thornley and Gibb, 2007) examined the role of conflicting and yet mutually 
dependent oppositions, primarily between the subjective and the objective, in understanding the 
persistently intractable nature of IR and dialectical models have also recently been used in image 
retrieval (dos Santos et al., 2008). This paper, in its discussion on the contradictions and conflicts 
in change, builds on this work and provides some new theoretical and historical context to the 
nature of these tensions. Before proceeding with a detailed discussion of change, however, I 
briefly review my model of IR which perceives it as essentially a dialectic process characterised 
by paradox and conflict with change as an important component. 
A dialectical model of IR 
IR is sub-set of information science which focuses on the specific problem of how to represent 
and organise documents (of any sort) in systems which then best facilitate the retrieval (i.e. 
finding and accessing) of relevant documents by users. Thus IR examines the optimal way of 
allowing effective communication or, at least a connection, between a document stored in a 
system and a user.  The question of whether this is a process of communication or merely one of 
connection will be discussed in the next sub-section. IR then is concerned with the relationship 
between an objective document (in so far as it is a physical object) and a user’s subjective 
experience of that document. What kind of relationship is this? I argue that it is a dialectical 
relationship involving conflict and dependencies in which there is rarely a clear and absolute 
solution. Any representation of a document must both be ‘about’ the document yet must also be 
simplified (or made less ‘about’ the document) so it  may be found a by a user. It must also be 
‘relevant’ enough to ‘inform’ but not so similar that it just replicates existing knowledge.  An 
examination of themes discussed in a range of IR traditions over the decades (Neill, 1987; Ellis, 
1996; Thornley, 2009; Bawden and Robinson, 2009) reveal a clear involvement with the 
problem of intractable and often paradoxical dilemmas. This approach to IR as a relationship 
between opposing forces or objectives  is also discussed in the early work of van Rijsbergen 
(1979, p.30) who concludes that the relationship between representation and discrimination is 
one of ‘optimal trade offs’. Cole (1997) and also van Rijsbergen (1993) illustrate the difficulty of 
articulating information needs in IR and of recognizing potentially relevant documents by using 
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Meno’s paradox  (Plato. Trans Syndenham, 1773). This paradox claims the impossibility of 
recognizing or knowing something that we do not already know i.e. how can we gain knowledge 
from the unknown?  More recently Mai’s (2011) examination of the problem of classification 
explores the tension between subjectivity and objectivity in how LIS describes and categorises 
documents.   
I argue that one way of understanding these conflicts and tensions is as a dialectical process. The 
dialectic is between the subjective and objective in so far as it is concerned with providing access 
to an objective object (a document of some sort) for a person with a subjective experience of that 
document including a particular context in which it may or may not be perceived to be relevant. 
The objective document and the subjective experience of it are both very different and also, for 
IR to work at all, related in some ways.  It is managing this relationship which is characterised by 
conflict (between the object and the subjective experience and also between various different 
subjective experiences of the same object) which is central to IR. In particular, it is managing 
this relationship in a way which best facilitates a change in knowledge and also helps ensure it 
will be a qualitatively useful change in knowledge. There has been considerable work within IR 
and IS on the relationships between documents and users but limited investigation, particularly 
from a philosophical perspective, into what this change process actually consists of. 
I investigate the role of change in IR by exploring discussions on the nature and existence (or 
possible non-existence) of change in philosophy with a particular focus on the Platonic dialogues 
of ‘Parmenides’ and, to an extent, the ‘Theaitetos’. I argue that these reveal a perennial 
philosophical problem with understanding the nature of change. In particular, when we try to 
articulate exactly how change exists and works in the world at both an abstract and a physical 
level we tend to find ourselves dealing in contradictions, paradox and dilemmas that we can’t 
seem to completely resolve.  I argue that in IR it is when we try to articulate exactly how 
information exists and works at an abstract and a physical level that we also tend to come across 
contradictions, paradox and dilemmas that we can’t seem to completely resolve. Why is this? It 
is at least partly because when we talking about information we are also talking about change, 
hence if understanding the nature of change is problematic this will also follow for information. 
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I also argue that disagreement about the role of otherwise of change in our understanding of 
information and thus of IR is an important source of disagreement between different research 
traditions. Thus the answer to the question ‘Is change part of how we should understand 
information?’ can be used as one way to understand the divisions within the IR tradition. This 
can be illuminated by discussing it within the context of Parmenides’ question ‘Is change part of 
how we should understand the world?’ which also is a central division between different 
philosophical world views. In the following two sub- sections I discuss firstly those in IR, and 
also in the broader field of IS, who argue that change is not part of information and secondly I 
discuss those who claim it to be of paramount importance. Finally I highlight shared themes in 
both perspectives in addressing the problem of defining information and thus IR.  
Change is not part of IR 
The more objective tradition within IR, as characterised by the early work of van Rijsbergen 
(1979), proposes that its purpose is to provide a user with details of documents about his or her 
request. The question of whether or not they do actually inform the user is outside IR’s remit. 
Thus IR is about facilitating a connection in terms of providing access to a document rather than 
about communication which would include concern about the effects of the document. Van 
Risjbergen cites Lancaster (1968) in the first page of his introduction to ‘Information Retrieval’ 
(1979) as providing a ‘perfectly straightforward definition’ of IR 
“An IR system does not inform (i.e. change the knowledge of) the user on the subject of his 
enquiry. It merely informs of the existence of (or not) and whereabouts of documents relating to his 
request.”  (Lancaster, 1968, In Van Rijsbergen, 1979, p.5) 
 
This long-standing perspective that IR is about the relationship between the content of a 
document and the content of a query without the requirement for any detailed analysis of the 
actual impact on the user is still very prevalent. It can be seen, for example, in the large-scale test 
collections such as the Test Retrieval Evaluation Conferences which is generally known within 
IR as TREC (http://trec.nist.gov/).  The success of competing techniques are calculated based on 
their ability to retrieve documents with relevant content rather than on the experience of users.  
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Thus the assumption is that if the content analysis is good enough  then there is no need to study 
the extent or the quality of the users’ change in knowledge.  
This assumption does appear to be valid in many cases as significant improvements in system 
design have not generally come from the user study led tradition. This has been observed by, for 
example Hjorland (1997, 2000), who criticises the ad hoc nature of user studies and Ellis  (1992) 
who observes that the cognitive tradition's claims to model and understand the subjective 
experience of information have not translated into the improved performance of IR systems.  
More recent developments involving the user in  searching, such as  Google with PageRank’s use 
of citation  links (Brin and Page, 1998) and  the use of ‘popularity’ scores for pages over and 
above content  (White,  Bilenko and Silviu , 2007) have transformed searching or certainly the 
experience of searching in many ways. There are, however, significant voices who challenge the 
extent of any real improvement in the retrieval of high quality and informative content (Tenopir, 
2001; Bawden and Robinson, 2009). Involving users and thereby dynamically changing 
relevance is becoming increasingly possible but its value perhaps remains complex and unclear.  
Change is part of IR  
There is also a research tradition in IS and IR which emphasises the importance of change in its 
modelling of information. Brookes (1980) argued that the ‘fundamental equation’ of information 
science was the extent to which a knowledge structure is changed and becomes modified by 
information.  This view remains influential and the juxtaposition of the term ‘equation’ implying 
a defined and predictable process with the actual thing to be observed ( a change in knowledge 
structure) reveals much of the problematic nature of this perspective. There is also the 
complication that generally we would define becoming informed as not only a change in extent 
of knowledge state but also an improvement, for example a deeper understanding or a more 
comprehensive one, as change could also include deterioration, for example using a faulty 
research study which then changes medical practice. 
Buckland’s (1991, 1991a) theory of information defines it as a problem with three (at least) 
perspectives: information as thing; information as process; information as knowledge. This can 
be seen as one approach to combine the apparently competing qualities of information in a way 
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which can model change (‘thing’ initiates a ‘process’ which initiates ‘knowledge’) and I interpret 
his work as an attempt to model a complex process involving multiple factors.  In his paper ‘ 
Information as thing’ (1991) he sometimes call all these factors ‘things’ but in my view in this 
particular case his terminology can be a  possible cause of confusion as they are not all ‘things’. 
Information is not one unified concept but rather a complex collection of things, events and 
mental change which work together (or sometimes don’t) to produce what we generally call 
information. He argues that rather than provide a unified definition of information that it is more 
useful to acknowledge that information has various qualities and we still call all of these 
information. This model can therefore include change as it explicitly discusses how ‘entities’ 
may initiate an intangible process (becoming informed) without insisting that only one of  these 
counts as ‘information’. 
Ingwersen (1992) stresses the importance of the ways in which information should change 
understanding arguing that ‘IR is pre-occupied with providing information, which may act as a 
supplement to a human conscious or unconscious mental condition in a given situation 
(Ingwersen, 1992, p. 25)’. The link with information with changes in cognition is also developed 
in later work (Ingwersen and Jarvelin, 2005). In this case information is not just about the 
content of the document (often referred to by Ingwersen as the meaning) but rather the actual 
effect it has on the user in their particular situation. How does it change their understanding and 
their ability to act differently? 
 
Change and defining IR  
A recurring theme in this discussion of change in IR is the nature of how information is defined 
and how this is related specifically to IR. In those that deny the importance of change they seem 
to acknowledge that perhaps change is part of the normal understanding of information but they 
explicitly state that IR is not concerned with that aspect. It deals with content not with the 
potential effects of that content. So the definition of information as it applies to IR is narrow and 
does not include change but there is an acknowledgement that different perspectives on 
information exist. In research traditions which do emphasise change the multiple factors within 
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information are acknowledged with the difference that these are seen as part of IR’s remit. Some 
complex work is then required to try and explain how they might work together to facilitate 
change. 
I argue that this shows that the only way we can deal with explaining change in information is to 
divide information. We can model its apparently competing qualities (for example as an 
inanimate object and as a mental process) if we say it all these things but in a very broad way. 
Then the decision is whether IR wants to include a consideration of the aspects of information 
that include change or just deal with the aspects that don’t. If we exclude change we have a much 
simpler problem but we aren’t able to explain or model the actual effects of IR systems. If we 
include change and attempt to model or explain it this becomes very difficult as we have to 
explain how these different aspects of information are related.  
This is very closely related to the discussion in ‘Parmenides’ where he argues that to allow the 
existence of change is to allow diversity and difference (reality is many) which leaves us with the 
philosophical problem of how these different things and/or qualities relate to each other. 
Therefore he argues change doesn’t exist and that reality is unified (reality is one) but, as his 
friends in the dialogue point out, this leaves us with the philosophical problem of how to explain 
the diversity and change that we appear to observe. In a similar way, the perspective within IR 
that claims change is outside the IR system allows the system to remain a unity without complex 
contradictions.  This is reassuring in some ways but doesn’t seem to adequately acknowledge the 
change and diversity that we observe in IR. Alternatively there is the IR  perspective that 
acknowledges change but then there is clearly much progress to be made in explaining and 
predicting how it actually happens. 
Change in philosophy 
The purpose of this section is to show that change is a fundamentally paradoxical process. 
Change is something that appears to happen all the time. When we, however, start examining 
how it actually occurs, we very quickly seem to get involved in discussing apparently 
contradictory and conflicting statements.  The evidence I will use is discussions on the nature of 
change in philosophy, primarily from the ancient tradition, which reveal the difficulty of 
understanding change. They also show that different philosophical views on change are central to 
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the differences between different philosophical world views. The purpose of this discussion is to 
reveal that current disagreements in IR about the nature of information can be connected to 
disputes about the nature of change. We can, therefore, use insights from this debate about 
change to extend our understanding of IR. 
Support for the thesis that change is a difficult and hard to define process is prevalent throughout 
the history of philosophy. It is closely linked to three central questions.  Firstly what is the nature 
of existence, secondly how we can describe what exists and thirdly, how we can know or 
measure what exists? In more recent times philosophy has continued to grapple with these 
questions and, for example, Wittgenstein’s (1922, 1953) work on the nature of language is 
closely tied to his views on the nature of existence and knowledge. Insights from the ancient 
tradition remain, however, important and influential. These three questions are also central to IR 
as IR represents and describes information about what exists in such as way as to best facilitate 
people gaining knowledge about it.  
The first question I examine is the philosophical discussion in ancient philosophy, primarily 
through the Socratic dialogue ‘Parmenides’, (Plato. Trans. Warrington, J. 1961) about whether 
existence is something that changes or not, or to put it another way, is change actually just an 
illusion or does the appearance of change, i.e. the fact that we perceive change happening,   
reflect reality (existence)? This is presented as a dichotomy between two theses, firstly reality is 
an unchanging unit (or the ‘One’) proposed by Zeno and Parmenides and the opposing thesis that 
reality is an ever changing plurality (the doctrine of perpetual flux or the ‘Many’). These 
opposing views are pitted against each other in the style of the dialectic method of argument to 
see which viewpoint leads one into fewer contradictions than its opponent. The second question I 
discuss is how we can describe what exists and this can be understood as a problem of language. 
How can we group particular instances which appear to change under general descriptions which 
seem to be abstract and unchanging? This is also known as the problem of participation, for 
example, how does an individual dog ‘participate’ in our general descriptive term ‘dog’. Finally I 
analyse the problem of measuring or gaining knowledge about what exists and its relationship to 
the existence or otherwise of change. If the world is constantly changing how can we gain 
reliable knowledge about the world? Within the Platonic tradition it was seen as imperative to 
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answer these three questions which can be summarised as the problems of existence, language 
and knowledge, and the debate here is about whether allowing change into our world view makes 
it easier or more difficult to provide a satisfactory (and non-contradictory) answer to these 
questions. In the rest of this section I tackle in turn the problems of change and existence, change 
and participation (or language) and finally change and measurement or knowledge within a 
philosophical context. In the next section on ‘Change in IR’ I then use these insights from 
philosophy to tackle the same problems in the context of IR. 
Change and the problem of existence  
Change was seen as a problematic issue in ancient philosophy because if one allowed its 
existence, it seemed to lead one into philosophical contradictions as it suggested that things 
could be (exist) and simultaneously not be (during change aspects would stop existing). It 
appears from looking at the world that lots of things exist and then stop existing and then come 
into being again. This is perplexing as it appears to imply that objects somehow contain their 
own negation which appears contradictory. So we can perceive change but it is problematic to fit 
this perception into a cohesive and non-contradictory philosophical world view. In order to 
understand the nature of this debate one needs to know that for the Ancient Greeks ‘being’ or 
‘existence’ were seen almost as a ‘thing’ as Anscombe discusses in her work on Wittgenstein 
and Parmenides. 
 
“Parmenides does not treat to be as an object, but rather being, i.e. something being or some being 
thing. It is difficult to use the participle in English in the required way, and we might get closer to 
the sense by saying “what is”.” (Anscombe, 1981, p.x) 
 
Thus if change exists then ‘being’ must also contain ‘non-being’. Parmenides and Zeno argue 
that change therefore cannot exist, it is all an illusion.   Reality is a unity (or the One) in which 
no change occurs as we see in Socrates’ summary of their arguments below. It is not the case that 
many different things exist (the many) and that they all change, rather reality is one unchanging 
unity. 
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“Soc: Ah! Since unlike cannot be like, or like unlike, it must also be impossible that reality should 
be many, because if it were it would have irreconcilable characters. Am I right then in saying that 
your arguments have no other purpose than to maintain, against all contrary assertions, that reality 
is not many? Do you believe that each of those arguments proves this one point, and that you 
yourself, accordingly, are offering as many proofs that reality is not many as you may have put 
forward arguments? [128] Is that what you mean or have I misunderstood you? 
 
Zeno: No, you have a perfect grasp of my theory as a whole.” 
(Plato, Parmenides, [127-128], trans. Warrington. 1961) 
 
The discussion continues with Zeno showing that his thesis that ‘reality is not many’ was written 
to support Parmenides’ thesis that ‘reality is one’. They both attempt to show that the allowance 
of plurality or the thesis ‘reality is many’ “when closely examined, involves yet greater 
absurdities than our assumption of the One” (Plato, Parmenides, [128] trans. Warrington. 1961) 
The alternative world view which they are attempting to overthrow in this dialogue is the one 
presented by Heraclitus in the Socratic dialogue ‘Theaitetos’. Heraclitus claims that everything 
changes all the time which is also sometimes known as the doctrine of perpetual flux. This is 
characterized by the expression ‘One can never step into the same river twice’ and proposes that 
reality is an ever changing flow. The implications of this for knowledge are that ‘man is the 
measure of all things’ ‘Theaitetos [152] and that there is no objective external reality that we can 
reliably know about.  
 
What kind of absurdities or contradictions do Parmenides and Zeno marshal to show that reality 
is indeed one and not many and that continuous change, as proposed by Heraclitus in his theory, 
is an illusion?  Their major objection to the existence of the  many is that is seems to require that 
things both exist and don’t exist simultaneously. In order to understand the debate here we need 
to see what is meant by ‘things’ in this context. Firstly it is necessary to distinguish between the 
abstract and the physical in this debate. Is it actual physical reality that must be a unified whole 
containing no change or contradiction or is it the abstract model of reality which must behave in 
this way? Plato’s philosophy argues that there exists a number of abstract ‘forms’ (for example 
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justice and beauty) in which reality (or things) as we perceive it partake and thus gain their 
qualities. Thus a ‘just act’ is ‘just’ in so far as it participates in the form of justice. In this 
dialogue Socrates’ argues that if you accept this split between the abstract forms and the physical 
world then the apparent contradictions arising from the assertion that the ‘one is many’ 
disappear.  Just because one observes that an individual object contains or partakes in apparently 
contradictory qualities this is not problematic as one is not concluding that the actual qualities 
themselves partake in their opposites, rather that they are both present in the one instance.  He 
challenges Zeno to show that abstract qualities or ‘forms’ have to partake in their opposites if 
many of them (rather than a unity of one) are said to exist. 
“We may therefore conclude that if a man sets out to demonstrate that that such things as stones, 
bits of stones, etc. are simultaneously many and one, we shall say that he proves that some thing is 
both many and one, not that unity is plurality or vice versa. We shall find nothing extraordinary in 
what he says which is, after all, mere commonplace. If, on the other hand having clearly 
demonstrated the Forms, to which I just referred-e.g. Likeness and Unlikeness, Plurality and Unity, 
Rest and Motion, etc.-he goes on to prove that these can alternatively merge into and separate from 
one another, then, Zeno, I shall be dumbfounded.”(Plato, Parmenides, [129] trans. Warrington. 
1961) 
 
 
The rest of the dialogue is an extended attempt by Parmenides to demonstrate that, even at this 
abstract level of the forms, allowing the existence of the ‘many’ rather than the ‘One’ still forces 
one into contradictions as can be seen in the following discussion on the problem of how objects 
participate in abstract qualities. 
Change and the problem of participation 
There is still, for example, the problem of how one can demonstrate that the physical world 
partakes of these forms. How can the form of large be distributed to objects without being forced 
to partake also in its opposite the form of small? If we allow that change and diversity exist how 
can we manage to have a precise descriptive language that will not sometimes, or perhaps 
always, do an imperfect job of representing the exact nature of what it describes? In terms of IR 
we can see this in the problem of document representation which is always, by its very nature, 
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partial and incomplete (Buckland, 1991). In terms of Platonic philosophy do forms have to be 
divisible so they can be distributed amongst things in the world and does this mean they are no 
longer accurate or perfect representations? 
“Par: look now, suppose you split up Magnitude itself and say that every large thing is large by 
virtue of a part of Magnitude, which is less than magnitude itself; won’t your statement appear 
rather silly? 
Soc: it will indeed.” 
(Plato, Parmenides, [131] trans. Warrington. 1961) 
 
The difficulty being examined here is what happens to abstract universals when they are used to 
describe or define or create a case in the particular. By getting involved in reality is their pure 
nature sullied to the extent that they no longer qualify as a satisfactory abstract universal? If we 
accept Socrates’ suggestion that the forms are unified and unchanging and therefore contain no 
contradictions then how can we explain how the forms are actually used to give qualities to 
objects in the physical world? This process seems to suggest that they would have to be divided 
up in some way and thus be less than their whole and therefore no longer a perfect abstract 
model. 
This debate is interesting and relevant to IR as it reflects issues on the use of classification 
schemes and taxonomies. How can a particular information item be definitively catalogued under 
a particular subject heading and at what point does a changing physical reality or a changing 
understanding of a physical reality, mean that we should change, radically or otherwise, an 
existing way of representing and organising knowledge? An interesting example of this problem 
is Hjorland’s (2009, p. 1534, endnote 65) discussion of the controversial role of genetic 
knowledge in species classification. 
So we can see that one problem with the nature of change discussed in Platonic philosophy is its 
relationship to unity and diversity in so far as, if change and therefore diversity exist, then 
individual objects must be able to participate in general qualities. The effect, however, that 
allowing the existence of change has on the nature of abstract universals is seen as problematic 
for the purity and accuracy of these universals.  This is a problem of language and meaning as it 
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examines how we can describe and talk about the world accurately and also a problem of 
information in that it is concerned with how we can organise and group our descriptions. 
Change and the problem of measurement/knowledge 
The third argument used to show that a belief in the existence of change raises more 
contradictions than the opposing view of unified stability is the argument about how we can 
accurately perceive or measure change. Initially we may say that we perceive change around us 
all the time, yet, when we are pressed to say exactly when it happened we can find it hard to give 
a convincing answer. In the following section Parmenides argues that once one tries to pinpoint 
the moment of change one is forced to assert a contradiction (that something both does and does 
not exist at any given point in time) therefore change cannot in fact exist. 
“Par: Exactly when, then, does the change occur? It cannot do so when the subject is at rest, nor 
when it is in motion, not within any period of time. 
Arist: Clearly not. 
Par: Very good; there must really be that paradoxical something-or-other in which the subject must 
be at the actual moment of change. 
Arist. What ‘something- or- other’? 
 
Par: Why, the instant.  The word ‘instant’ would appear to signify that from which change takes 
place in either direction, or something of the sort. Change from the state of rest does not occur 
while the subject remains stationary, nor change from that of motion while the subject continues to 
move. No, between motion and rest there stands this paradoxical entity, the instant, which marks no 
period of time whatsoever. Into it and from it the moving or stationary object changes respectively 
towards rest or motion.” (Plato, Parmenides, [156] trans. Warrington. 1961) 
 
In the dialogue Zeno also supports the view that reality is an unchanging unity. He develops 
Parmenides’ arguments through developing a series of paradoxes to logically demonstrate that 
change is an illusion. Motion, for example, is in fact an illusion and the reason is that accurately 
measuring a precise moment in motion is seen as impossible. In order to reach a destination one 
must first reach a half way point. When one reaches that half way point there is yet another one 
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to reach and this process is logically infinite. This means that, despite appearances, we can never 
actually get anywhere.  
To the modern mind this may seem so far from how we experience reality as not to be of 
concern. In fact, however, concerns about the reliability of measurement are an important and 
current issue in quantum physics. In Schrödinger’s discussion of the infamous cat both the 
problem of how measuring something alters it and also the problem of simultaneous ‘being’ and 
‘not-being’ in terms of the cat being alive and dead simultaneously at one point are discussed.  In 
terms of IR, accurately identifying and measuring the moment when a document changes a 
knowledge state is very difficult, sometimes even for the user, not even taking into account the 
other related problems of how we measure or evaluate this in IR system testing.  
Conclusions on change in philosophy 
In this dialogue the participants grapple with the problem of how to explain the existence of 
change without succumbing to contradictions.  Change seems to imply some kind of process 
from not-being to being and this allows the existence of negation into being, seen in this dialogue 
as contradictory to the nature of existence. Can we solve this apparent contradiction by saying 
that existence is in a perfect unity, the ‘One’ as Parmenides argues and that therefore change 
doesn’t exist? Can we solve this apparent contradiction by using Plato’s arguments that only 
physical objects change but abstract entities, the forms, which are what actually exists, do not 
change and thus do not contain contradictions?  Thus a particular object may change and contain 
negations of its qualities etc. but this is not a philosophical problem for existence per se.  
Parmenides attempts to show it is still a problem because of the mechanics of how abstract 
entities can be distributed amongst physical objects e.g. how could the ‘large’ be split up without 
each part of it being smaller than the ‘large’ and thus again we have contradictions. Zeno links 
this to the paradox of measuring movement. It appears that movement does exist but how can we 
possibly identify when and how it exactly happens without becoming mired in paradox? So in 
this dialogue it is the doctrine of unity without change which seems to be gaining precedence as 
incorporating change into our understanding of what exists (the problem  of existence) , how we 
can describe what exists (the problem of language) and how we can measure what exists (the 
problem of knowledge) appear to pose serious problems. My purpose in discussing these 
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dialogues is not an attempt to show that change doesn’t exist but rather to show that 
incorporating an understanding of change into a philosophical view of existence, language and 
knowledge will often involve one in apparent contradictions and philosophical difficulties.   
 
In the next section,  I proceed to show that discussion on the nature of change and its relationship 
to existence, language and the nature of knowledge presented in the format of paradoxes leading 
to complex contradictions is also an appropriate method for understandings its role in IR.  This is 
because IR is concerned with the problem of how can we organise our knowledge (which is itself 
continually changing and improving) of what exists in a way which maximises the chances of 
this knowledge informing (or changing) the knowledge of users. I argue that teasing out the 
contradictions in this process at the most fundamental level provides insights into some of the 
conflicting requirements that we observe when trying to develop both  theoretical models of IR 
and  also design systems. 
Change in IR 
The contradictions in the concept of change that we see discussed in ancient philosophy are one 
of the reasons why IR remains such a theoretically and pragmatically intractable problem.  As 
discussed earlier most theories of information and also of IR include some discussion on change. 
Views on the nature of this change vary depending on the different perspectives on the nature of 
information. Theories of information that emphasise the objective aspects of information 
understand change as an imperfection (noise) in the transmission of the same message from 
sender to receiver (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). The more subjective approach normally sees 
this change as a shift in the user’s knowledge state Brookes (1980). So if change is an essential 
aspect of our understanding of information is it the aspect of information that makes it an elusive 
and contradictory phenomenon? Does the change requirement in information raise similar 
problems to the problems in change as discussed in ancient philosophy? In this section I  show  
how the problem of change as discussed in ‘Parmenides’ in terms of the problems of existence, 
participation between generals and particulars, and knowledge and measurement is closely 
related to similar problem in IR.  
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Change and the problem of existence 
In IR we are normally concerned with the problem of how documents (in the broadest sense) 
about things (or ideas) that do exist (or did at some point) can be stored and represented in such a 
way that they can potentially create a change in the knowledge state in a user. Documents and, to 
a greater or lesser extent all aspects of language, are a bridge or connection between the world 
and our understanding of the world. Thus we have existence, our immediate perception of it and 
also a record or description of that perception in documents. Thus IR systems are both a defence 
against change (the temporary and fragile nature of undocumented knowledge) and also their 
purpose is to facilitate change in users through access to that knowledge. 
How is this related to our earlier discussion on the problem of existence and change? The 
incorporation of change or otherwise into our understanding of  IR raises some interesting issues 
about the juxtaposition of non-being and being in terms of documents.  Does a document exist 
when it is  stored and represented but not read or used (even if it is retrieved) or do we say that is 
only really exists as information when it has changed the knowledge state of a user? A document 
can both exist in one sense (be stored in the IR system) and yet also not exist in at least two 
senses (it may not be found or it may be found but not read or understood). For an interesting 
discussion on why certain documents of great importance may get lost and neglected for long 
periods of time see Bawden’s (2004) discussion of the failure to recognise the significance for 
genetics of Mendel’s work on pea hybridisation. So in this way the view that our understanding 
of documents should somehow incorporate their potential to change their reader does bring in 
some of the contradictions regarding the nature of change and being and not-being. If we jettison 
this requirement and claim that IR systems simply let the user knows about the existence or 
otherwise of documents, then to some extent, this problem disappears. If we remain at the level 
of ‘information as thing’ i.e. if we don’t try and model the change process, we have much less 
contradictory problem on our hands. Buckland (1991a) does use his model of the multi-faceted 
nature of information to model the way a document can be one sort of information (thing) but not 
another (process, knowledge). The intangible and hard to predict qualities of the document (its 
effects) are generally associated with its relationship with change.  This complex relationship 
between a documents and its potential effects can be seen in the fundamental nature of IR in that 
IR systems contain objects (or ‘information as thing’ in Buckland’s terminology) and IR users 
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are undergoing a process or there is ‘something going on’ (to borrow Magee’s (2000) phrase on 
Hegel), with the IR user’s level of understanding and knowledge. In my view Buckland’s (1991, 
1991a) characterization of information in this way remains the most useful contribution to 
understanding the multi-faceted and complex nature of information. The question remains, 
however, as to how we can best model the relationship between these different aspects.  I argue 
that this relationship is essentially a change process in which very different, yet related things, 
have to in some way interact to produce an ‘informed’ user. Buckland acknowledges that it is in 
the relationships between the different aspects of information systems that theoretical insights are 
likely to arise.  
 
“Information systems (and their users) form a system of interacting parts. We should expect that 
the relationship among these parts will constitute a major part of any adequate description or theory 
of information systems.” (Buckland, 1991, p.27) 
 
Exploring the nature of change is an important part of understanding the nature of these 
relationships.  The potential of a document to create change is something within the document 
that may or may not come into being. Aristotle, working after Plato, used the concepts of 
actuality and potentiality to show how something could both be and not be in an attempt to show 
that allowing the existence of change did not lead one into contradictions. Aristotle accepted that 
change did exist and did much work on analysing how it may actually happen. 
“Every potentiality is at one and the same time a potentiality for its opposite; for, while that which 
is not capable of being present in a subject cannot be present, everything that is capable of being 
may possibly not be actual. That, then, which is capable of being may either be or not be; the same 
thing then is capable of being and not being.” Chapter 8, [5-15] Aristotle. Metaphysics, book 1X, 
trans. Ross, 1924.  In Ackrill, J.L. ed. (1987) 
 
This is interesting for IR as it provides a model for understanding the ways in which a document 
can be potentially information and yet, in actuality, it may not be information. This problem of 
how we can talk about things that don’t exist and how things can come to be out of something 
different from themselves and then perhaps, change again is, I argue, underlying many of the 
22 
 
ongoing dilemmas in IR. This can be seen as a problem of potentiality (the possibility of 
becoming information) and of actuality (the fact or existence of becoming information).  
Change and the problem of participation  
Is the problem of participation, or how do particulars ‘partake’ in their general descriptions, 
really as complex and contradictory as Plato seems to be claiming in ‘Parmenides’ and other 
dialogues? How does allowing the existence of change make this more difficult? In this section I 
examine what the problem of participation means to IR and how it is related to the problem of 
change. 
In IR participation or allocating how particulars should be described under general/abstract 
concepts can be understood in at least three ways. Firstly how can we decide on what basis we 
should group or classify documents under a particular term. What is it about these different 
documents which is both significant and similar enough to justify grouping them together? 
Secondly the problem of participation can be understood as the extent to which different users 
will share similar interpretations (or on a simplified level similar search terms) when they are 
searching for documents ‘about’ a particular topic? How can we ensure that this index term will 
‘work’ for the largest number of users who might find this document relevant? Thirdly, with the 
development of both individually personalised and also shared (through access to the tags of 
other users) tagging systems there is the problem of participation or continuation through time. 
How can I be sure that the term that I use to tag this photograph today will still make sense to me 
in five years time? There is a dilemma here in that a strictly controlled indexing system may not 
respond well to changing terminology making older documents harder to retrieve.  A system, 
however, which allows unlimited change, may also result in the failure to retrieve documents as 
there is no external check on the terms that might have been used. 
All of these can be interpreted as different approaches to the problem of change. The 
classification approach attempts to control and limit change by providing a fixed structure, the 
automated (or derived/post-coordinate) approach responds to changes in the document collection 
by changing the content and significance of index terms to reflect this. The social tagging 
approach allows change on a personal level and facilitates differences in individual 
interpretation.  These are attempts, like all of IR, to somehow coordinate the system ‘view’ of the 
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document  with the user ‘view’ to facilitate retrieval of relevant documents.  Change is central to 
this problem. This ‘matching’ of views both requires some way of limiting change and also of 
facilitating it.  Limiting change , which  is emphasised in classification schemes,  leads to 
imperfect links between documents and their classification ‘slots’. The alternative approach 
when the indexing scheme is a reflection of the documents (post-coordinate) allows changes in 
terminology over time to be reflected in the indexing terms. This can also result in  failure to 
retrieve older documents indexed using discontinued terms and  also a loss of an historical record 
of  the previous terminology of a subject. The social tagging approach allows far more change in 
the representative process both at an individual level (I can choose to change my tags as I wish) 
and at a social level ( the ‘relevance’ of a page will depend dynamically on how it is tagged by 
other users). 
Blair (1990, 2006) argues that the central problem in IR is enabling the user to make a better 
judgement of the words an indexer (human or automated) might have used to represent a 
document which the user would find relevant. This is difficult, according to Blair, because unlike 
in an oral conversation the documents are removed from the context in which they were created 
and thus words, rather than features such a place, tone or  task, become the only things that can 
convey the ‘meaning’ of the document. Is this mismatch between a user choice of word and an 
indexer choice of words fundamentally a problem of change?  It is problem of change in  so far 
as the words in the document are not going to change but an individual user’s view of their  
information need is almost certainly going to change. The group of potential users in the future 
will also have different viewpoints. It is also a problem of difference (different descriptor words) 
and sameness (the same document would in fact be relevant but indexer and user are describing 
it differently).  The passage of time would initially appear likely to increase the chances that the 
user and the indexer will use different terms to describe the same document.  Buckland (1991, 
p.61) observes that within IR “delay and indirectness are liable to exacerbate difficulties caused 
by problems of definability”.  
Hjorland (2009, p.35) discusses as one possible solution to this problem the potential role of 
begriiffgeschicte (conceptual history) which create certain kinds of dictionaries which map how 
a given word has changed and developed its meaning over time. They thus map and record the 
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context in which concepts are given their meaning.  Measuring this precisely, however, and 
accurately identifying when change occurred to the extent that this should be noted in descriptors 
would be challenging. 
Thus I argue that the problem   of change and participation between general and particulars as 
discussed in ‘Parmenides’ is strongly reflected in IR in terms of the problem of representing the 
meaning of a document. How do we deal with the dilemma that a document is normally a 
physical object yet its meaning or what it is ‘about’ it will be interpreted by a user as something 
that changes over time and also between different individuals? How can this be reflected in an IR 
system without creating more (or just the same amount but of a different nature) problems than it 
solves? There remains the problem that it is possible for a document to both be about x in one 
sense (it contains those terms) and to not be about x in another sense (it will not in fact be 
relevant to a user). This is generally because the document doesn’t change but the user’s 
understanding and situation does.  Attempts to solve this, however, by allowing users the 
facilities to change or personalise their perspective on documents, can raise new dilemmas 
especially in terms of access to documents over time (Thornley, 2009). 
Change and the problem of measurement/knowledge 
In the discussion  in ‘Parmenides’ we see the argument that change must be an illusion because, 
even if it appears to happen, it is impossible to pinpoint or accurately measure exactly when it 
happens. Is this also a problem for IR and does it raise any contradictions or fundamental 
conflicts? I argue that this problem of accurately measuring change is a difficulty for IR in terms 
of how we measure whether documents are relevant. 
This is seen in the whole problem in IR of defining and measuring relevance. This is discussed, 
for example, by Borlund (2003) who argues that we are reaching consensus on these questions 
by incorporating multi-dimensional and dynamic aspects to our model of relevance. Taylor 
(2012), more recently, has studied how relevance judgment criteria are linked to cognitive 
changes during the search process.   Thus, increasingly, models of relevance incorporate change 
(information is seen as a process not just a relationship between a document and query) and other 
multiple factors and variables. Using these models in the design of large scale design of IR 
systems may remain problematic but the incorporation of change is seen as an important goal. 
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In terms of measuring relevance there is also the problem of whether recent IR developments 
using context give the appearance of producing relevant results for the user whilst often not 
retrieving information which is likely to dramatically change knowledge.  One could argue that 
social web and recommender systems with their emphasis on document popularity and the 
activities of other users (over content) actually just facilitate and encourage ‘more of the same’. 
In terms of an individual user focussing on past and previously popular searches also discourages  
divergence from established methods of searching.  This can also been seen with the increasing 
use of bibliometric indictors in presenting and organising documents. Many academic journal 
webpages now alert the reader to the  ‘most cited’ and ‘most downloaded’ documents.  So here 
the measurement of citations or downloads is used to suggest relevance but is this is a good 
indicator of how much the document may change the user? Does this actually reduce the extent 
to which different perspectives are presented to the user in so far as the popular papers are only 
likely to become more popular as they are retrieved first?  This may make for a less challenging, 
in every sense, IR experience but is it optimal for the growth i.e. change of knowledge?  
IR systems, and IS in general, should offer users a selection of documents with competing ideas 
and/or theories to allow the user to make a choice for themselves. Early discussions on these 
themes include work by Mitroff (1972) using dialectical theory and also Swanson’s (1986) work 
on developing methods of identifying unknown but useful links between disparate disciplines. 
Ford (1999) also examined the best way for IR to support original and creative thinking. Recent 
work on this approach, often known as literature based IR, and the best way to evaluate it has 
also been done by Cervino-Beresi, Baillie and Ruthven, (2008). These approaches are an almost 
explicit modelling of the tension between sameness and different within relevance in terms of 
actually creating and facilitating a change in knowledge. It does seem to be the case that 
dramatic shifts and changes in knowledge often appear to happen without the steady 
accumulation of related data that traditional IR systems are to an extent, predicated on, as 
Bawden (2006) observes in his observations on the scientific development of Einstein. Thus if IR 
is to optimally increase knowledge it must also examine how it can optimally facilitate change 
and this seems to require access to divergent and, often seemingly irrelevant, information. 
Finding ways to predict the ability of a document to change the knowledge of the user is clearly 
far more complex that just measuring the similarity of a document and query.  
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Conclusions 
I have discussed how Plato’s discussion in ‘Parmenides’ on the nature of change raises some 
very problematic questions about the nature of change in terms of existence,  language and 
knowledge. I argue that change is central to IR as it is an important part of how we understand 
information.  Thus, if change is problematic, information will be problematic and, if information 
is problematic then the problem of how we represent it and retrieve it, i.e. information retrieval, 
will also be problematic.  In these conclusions I review how an analysis of change can help 
explain the intractable nature of some of IR’s central problems and finish with some reflections 
on how insights from ancient philosophy can help IR. 
Change and IR theory 
Theoretical progress in IR, despite considerable input, has remained mainly fragmented and is 
not clearly linked to significant improvements in system design. We know that information is a 
complex and theoretically unclear concept (Buckland, 1991, 1991a; Raber and Budd, 2003). An 
analysis of how this may relate to change and thus to very difficult issues concerning the 
relationship between being and non-being can help explain why this maybe the case.  Any area 
of enquiry which concerns itself with change has to articulate how things have the potential to 
become something that they are not. It would also appear that any problem which concerns itself 
with change has to somehow divide the problem into different parts. It then has to explain how 
different qualities and objects interact in ways which are often unclear. If we say change is not 
part of information we seem to exclude from our understanding of information things that we 
would normally call information. Alternatively, we can say change is part of information and 
then we are often struggling to explain how and when this change happens. 
Change and information representation  
We know that representing the meaning of documents so that they can be found by users who 
would find them relevant is a complex problem.  Can an analysis of change contribute to why 
this might remain the case?  I argue that it is the way in which our understanding of meaning 
changes that makes this such a difficult problem.  Our interpretation of meaning changes over 
time as one individual and also, on a larger scale, over periods of time and between different 
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groups of people.  IR presents us with documents and even during one IR session our 
understanding and interpretation of our information need can change.  The problem of how to 
organise documents so that they can best facilitate knowledge change (i.e. new knowledge) also 
seems to depend on the ability to bring seemingly very different but also related documents 
together (Swanson, 1986; Cervino-Beresi et al, 2008). This is a challenge for IR as relevance 
normally implies similarity. 
Change and IR evaluation 
We know that evaluating IR systems in a meaningful and reliable way remains a complex 
problem (Robertson, 2008; Ellis, 1996) with diverging views in the field of the best approach to 
take.  I argue that this is because we are, in one sense, trying to measure change, and this is what 
makes it so difficult. How can we pinpoint when someone becomes ‘informed’ and can we know 
when they are informed ‘enough’? Should we concern ourselves with that or just concentrate on 
retrieving documents that may or may not inform them but that appear to be relevant?  In this 
case are we trying to predict, in an imperfect manner, potential change?  
In Plato’s dialogue ‘The Meno’ (Trans. Syndenham, 1773) as discussed in relation to IR by Cole 
(1997) and Van Rijsbergen (1993) the problem of how gaining new knowledge seems to imply 
that we know and recognise what we do not know is discussed.  In this dialogue, however, Plato 
regards this contradiction as so insoluble that he concludes that gaining knowledge through 
empirical experience, and thus by implication the existence of information, is impossible. Plato 
thought that knowledge could not change, and thus it cannot rely on the changing and temporal 
nature of the senses, and he argued that we are born knowing everything. Learning is not a 
question of gaining new knowledge but of remembering what we already do know. Thus the 
relationship between what we already know and how we can add to it is clearly difficult and the 
complex nature of relevance is perhaps a reflection of that. 
What can we learn from ancient philosophy? 
The existence of IR rests on the assumption that change, certainly in terms of the accumulation 
of knowledge does exist, and that information from the past is pertinent to the present and the 
future. Surely this cannot be a thesis that leads to the contradictions that Zeno insists arise when 
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one allows that change happens? Change in terms of growth in knowledge does undisputedly 
seem to exist. At what exact point these changes occur and how is a fascinating and often non-
linear process as characterized in Kuhn’s seminal 1970 work on the nature of scientific 
revolutions. A revolution normally implies tensions and contradictions that suddenly become 
untenable in the face of new evidence forcing a radical shift in our understanding. The discussion 
we see in ‘Parmenides’ reflects how difficult it is to fully understand and model this kind of 
change process. We at least appear to observe it happening and, in IR, we often seem to retrieve 
relevant documents that we find useful but articulating it within a theoretical framework remains 
problematic.  There is no clear resolution to this but I argue we can learn more about the 
persistent paradoxes and contradictions we see in IR by examining how these conflicts have been 
discussed in ancient philosophy. The technological and scientific framework is clearly 
completely different but the central philosophical problem of how we interact with the world 
through language and knowledge remains very similar. We can, therefore, usefully study 
philosophical work on the contradictions inherent in change as a way of increasing our 
understanding of the contradictions and tensions involved in storing, representing and retrieving 
information for the purpose of changing knowledge.  
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